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NDA Current Affairs · IR/Diplomacy · 20 Oct 2026

Two Councils, and Which One Met at Dushanbe

India was represented at the 25th Meeting of the Council of Heads of Government (CHG) of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation at Dushanbe, Tajikistan, on 20 October 2026, by the Raksha Mantri. He called on member states to make concerted efforts to dismantle the entire ecosystem of terrorism, and said connectivity must be based on consultation and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries.

Before the content, the structure β€” because the single most common error about the SCO is to treat all its meetings as the same meeting.

The SCO has two councils, and they do different things

The Council of Heads of State (CHS) is the supreme organ of the organisation. It meets once a year at summit level, with presidents and prime ministers in attendance, and it takes the major political decisions β€” admission of new members, the organisation's strategic direction, and the summit declarations that make the news.

The Council of Heads of Government (CHG) is the second-highest body. It meets separately, usually later in the year, and its agenda is predominantly economic and budgetary: trade and investment cooperation, the organisation's budget, and the practical programmes that implement what the summit decided.

So the meeting at Dushanbe was not a summit. The summit of 2026 was held at Bishkek in the August-September period, and the Prime Minister attended that. The Dushanbe meeting is the working council that follows, which is why a Defence Minister rather than the Prime Minister led the delegation β€” the CHG is routinely attended at ministerial level by several members.

That distinction is examinable in its own right, and it also explains the tone of the Indian statement, which was about implementation and institutional discipline rather than about grand declarations.

What India actually said

Three propositions stand out, and each is a long-standing Indian position expressed in SCO language.

On terrorism. The formulation used was that there can be "no justification for terrorism, no double standards in addressing it, and no place for those who finance, support, or provide safe havens to terrorists." The phrase double standards is doing specific work in a room where India sits alongside states it accuses of exactly that, and the reference to financing, support and safe havens rather than to attacks themselves is deliberate β€” it shifts the target from the act to the ecosystem, which is the word the Minister used.

On connectivity. The statement that connectivity must rest on consultation and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity is the standing Indian position on large regional infrastructure initiatives that pass through territory India claims. India has declined to endorse connectivity language in SCO documents for this reason in previous years, and the phrasing at Dushanbe restates that objection without naming a project.

On institutional proliferation. The most interesting line was about the organisation itself: "A greater number of institutions does not necessarily translate into greater achievements. New mechanisms should focus on clearly identified needs, avoid duplication, and prioritise delivering practical value." That is a direct argument against the steady creation of new SCO centres and bodies β€” a reasonable position for a member that wants the organisation to function rather than to expand, and an unusual thing to say out loud in a multilateral forum.

The Minister also stressed that the SCO's success lies in creating opportunities for youth, entrepreneurs, farmers and small businesses, which fits the CHG's economic remit precisely.

The organisation, in the form examiners test

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation grew out of the Shanghai Five grouping and was established as the SCO in 2001. India and Pakistan became full members in 2017, at the Astana summit, having previously held observer status. The organisation's working languages are Russian and Chinese.

Its permanent bodies are the two to remember:

  • The Secretariat, located in Beijing, handling administration and coordination.
  • The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), located in Tashkent, the organisation's counter-terrorism body, which deals with information exchange on terrorism, separatism and extremism β€” the formulation the SCO calls "the three evils."

RATS is the mechanism behind the Indian emphasis on counter-terrorism in this forum. An organisation with a dedicated counter-terrorism structure provides a legitimate platform to press the point, which is a large part of why India values membership despite its disagreements with other members.

Why India stays in a forum it argues with

This is the analytical question, and it is worth preparing because it generalises to other groupings.

India's SCO membership places it in a room with Russia, China, the Central Asian republics, Pakistan and Iran. It is the only significant multilateral setting in which India engages the Central Asian states as a group β€” a region with which India has deep historical ties, significant energy and mineral interests, and no land connectivity, because the direct route runs through Pakistan.

The organisation therefore delivers something no bilateral track does: regular, structured access to Central Asia, plus a counter-terrorism platform, plus a seat at a table where decisions about the region's security architecture are discussed whether India is present or not. The costs are the obvious ones β€” the need to share a forum with states whose conduct India criticises, and the periodic refusal to sign up to connectivity language.

That calculation is the same one visible across India's recent multilateral conduct: participate where the platform gives access, shape the language where possible, and decline the specific commitments that conflict with core positions. It is the logic behind taking a command appointment inside a coalition without joining its enforcement missions, and behind bilateral exercising with partners that widens groupings without formalising them.

πŸ”‘ Revision block

  • The event: 25th Meeting of the Council of Heads of Government (CHG) of the SCO, at Dushanbe, Tajikistan, on 20 October 2026; India represented by the Raksha Mantri.
  • Two councils: the Council of Heads of State (CHS) is the supreme organ, meeting annually at summit level and taking major political decisions; the Council of Heads of Government (CHG) is the second council, handling the economic and budgetary agenda.
  • The 2026 summit was at Bishkek in the August-September period, attended by the Prime Minister. Dushanbe is the working council that follows.
  • India's three propositions: no justification, no double standards and no safe havens for those who finance, support or shelter terrorism; connectivity must respect sovereignty and territorial integrity; and more institutions do not mean more achievement β€” new mechanisms should avoid duplication.
  • The organisation: established as the SCO in 2001 from the Shanghai Five; India and Pakistan joined as full members in 2017; working languages Russian and Chinese.
  • Permanent bodies: Secretariat at Beijing; Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) at Tashkent, addressing the SCO's "three evils" of terrorism, separatism and extremism.
  • Why India participates: it is the principal multilateral setting giving India structured access to Central Asia, a region to which India has no land connectivity through friendly territory.

🎯 Practice MCQs

Q1. The 25th SCO Council of Heads of Government meeting of October 2026 was held at: (a) Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan (b) Dushanbe, Tajikistan (c) Astana, Kazakhstan (d) Tashkent, Uzbekistan

β†’ (b) Dushanbe hosted the CHG meeting on 20 October 2026; Bishkek had hosted the summit earlier in the year.

Q2. Which of the following is the supreme organ of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation? (a) Council of Heads of State (b) Council of Heads of Government (c) Council of National Coordinators (d) Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure

β†’ (a) The CHS meets at summit level and takes the organisation's major political decisions.

Q3. The Council of Heads of Government of the SCO deals principally with: (a) admission of new member states (b) command of joint military exercises (c) the economic and budgetary agenda (d) adjudication of disputes between members

β†’ (c) It handles trade and investment cooperation and the organisation's budget, implementing what the summit decides.

Q4. India became a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in: (a) 2017 (b) 2001 (c) 2005 (d) 2012

β†’ (a) India and Pakistan were admitted as full members in 2017, having earlier been observers.

Q5. The SCO's Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) is headquartered at: (a) Beijing (b) Moscow (c) Dushanbe (d) Tashkent

β†’ (d) RATS is at Tashkent; the SCO Secretariat is at Beijing.

Q6. The SCO's formulation of the "three evils" refers to: (a) poverty, illiteracy and disease (b) terrorism, separatism and extremism (c) narcotics, arms smuggling and human trafficking (d) climate change, pandemics and cyber attack

β†’ (b) RATS addresses these three, which is why India presses counter-terrorism in this forum.

Q7. India's standing objection to certain SCO connectivity language rests on: (a) the cost of participation (b) a preference for maritime over land routes (c) respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity (d) opposition to all foreign investment in infrastructure

β†’ (c) India holds that connectivity must be based on consultation and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Q8. The Raksha Mantri's remark that "a greater number of institutions does not necessarily translate into greater achievements" was an argument for: (a) avoiding duplication in new SCO mechanisms (b) expanding SCO membership (c) relocating the SCO Secretariat (d) creating a new SCO development bank

β†’ (a) He urged that new mechanisms address clearly identified needs and deliver practical value.

Q9. The SCO was formally established in: (a) 1996 (b) 2001 (c) 2009 (d) 2015

β†’ (b) It was established in 2001, growing out of the earlier Shanghai Five grouping.

Q10. The principal strategic value of SCO membership for India is that it provides: (a) a defence guarantee against external attack (b) preferential tariff access across member states (c) a common currency arrangement (d) structured multilateral access to Central Asia

β†’ (d) India has no land connectivity to Central Asia through friendly territory, which makes the forum uniquely valuable.

πŸ“‹ How this gets asked (PYQ pattern)

The SCO is among the most frequently examined multilateral organisations in both the NDA and CDS papers, and this meeting supplies the distinction that separates prepared candidates from the rest.

The first form is the organ question. Council of Heads of State against Council of Heads of Government. Most candidates know the SCO holds a summit; far fewer know there are two councils and that the second is economic. A statement describing the Dushanbe CHG as "the SCO summit" is false, and that is exactly how the item will be written.

The second is the headquarters question, a perennial. Secretariat at Beijing, RATS at Tashkent. Candidates reliably reverse them.

The third is the membership-year question. India and Pakistan admitted together in 2017, and the SCO established in 2001 from the Shanghai Five. Pairs of years attached to one organisation are standard material.

A fourth is the "three evils" question β€” terrorism, separatism and extremism β€” which is distinctive SCO vocabulary and therefore easy to set.

For a written answer on India's multilateral diplomacy, the proposition worth making is about why a country stays in a forum where it is outvoted on language it cares about. The SCO gives India its only structured multilateral access to Central Asia, a counter-terrorism platform in RATS, and presence in discussions about regional security that would proceed without it β€” and those are worth the cost of sharing a table with states India criticises and of periodically refusing to sign connectivity text. State that trade-off explicitly, add the unusual institutional-restraint argument made at Dushanbe, and the answer is analysing a strategy rather than listing a meeting.

Preparing for NDA? For every multilateral body, learn three things β€” its organs, its headquarters and the year India joined. That trio answers most of what the GAT asks. Build the base with our NDA study material, follow the daily NDA current affairs, and train with serving-standard faculty in the upcoming Cavalier courses in Delhi.


✍️ Written by Col Vijyanat Thakur β€” Defence Studies & International Relations faculty at The Cavalier. Reviewed by the Cavalier Faculty Desk.