Every army in history has discovered the same thing the expensive way: the hardest boundary to cross in war is not the one facing the enemy. It is the one between your own services.
The Combined Operational Review and Evaluation (CORE) Programme 2026 exists to work on that boundary. Organised by Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) and conducted by the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS), the five-day programme ran from 14 to 18 September 2026 at the Manekshaw Centre, New Delhi.
What makes it worth a candidate's attention is who was in the room. Not only senior officers of the three Services, but officials of the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry of Home Affairs, alongside subject matter experts, academia, think tanks and government institutions. The Chief of Defence Staff, the Chief of the Naval Staff and the CISC interacted directly with participants, as did the Vice Chief of the Air Staff and the Vice Chief of the Army Staff.
The structure being built
Understanding why this programme matters requires the higher defence organisation, which is among the most reliably examined topics in the NDA paper.
Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) was raised on 23 November 2001. It is the apex tri-service organisation for the higher management of defence, and it followed the Kargil Review Committee and the resulting Group of Ministers report, which found that the 1999 conflict had been fought by three services coordinating rather than operating as one.
The Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (CISC) heads the IDS. A three-star officer drawn from any of the three services, the CISC is the executive in charge, with oversight of inter-service intelligence, doctrine, joint planning, budgetary allocation and training. On jointness, the CISC is second only to the Chief of Defence Staff.
The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), a four-star officer, was created in 2019 and is also Secretary, Department of Military Affairs in the Ministry of Defence. The CDS is the principal military adviser to the Raksha Mantri on tri-service matters and permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The individual service chiefs continue to advise on matters concerning their own service.
There is a detail in this chronology worth pausing on, because it explains the tempo of Indian defence reform. HQ IDS was raised in 2001. The CDS post was created in 2019. The staff organisation existed for eighteen years without the single-point authority it had been designed to serve — an integrated staff reporting to a committee of equals. That gap is the most honest single fact about how slowly jointness has advanced in India, and a candidate who knows it understands the subject rather than the vocabulary.
CENJOWS, the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, was raised in 2007 at the initiative of the Ministry of Defence, functions under HQ IDS, and is registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. It is a think tank mandated to examine joint warfare and synergy issues above sectoral and departmental legacies, and to provide an interface between the government, industry, academia and civil society.
Jointness, integration and theaterisation — three different words
These terms are used loosely in commentary and precisely in examinations. The distinction is worth holding.
Jointness is the three services planning and operating together while retaining separate structures. Joint exercises, joint doctrine, joint training, a joint staff. It is cooperation that has been made systematic.
Integration goes further: shared logistics, common procurement, unified communications and intelligence, so that the services depend on the same underlying systems rather than merely coordinating separate ones. Integration of the service headquarters with the Ministry of Defence — bringing uniformed officers into the ministry's decision-making — is a distinct strand of the same idea, and the creation of the Department of Military Affairs in 2019 was its main institutional step.
Theaterisation is the structural end-state under discussion: reorganising forces into theatre commands where all assets in a geographic area — land, air and naval — come under a single commander, rather than the present arrangement of separate service commands with overlapping boundaries. India currently has two joint commands: the Andaman and Nicobar Command, the only geographical tri-service command, and the Strategic Forces Command, which is functional and handles nuclear delivery.
The three words describe a progression: cooperate, share, unify. Most public debate about "theatre commands" is really a debate about how far along that progression India should move and at what pace.
What was actually discussed, and why it is not boilerplate
The programme's agenda covered jointness and integration, ongoing conflicts, modern ways of warfighting, non-kinetic aspects of national security, defence production and capability development. On technology: artificial intelligence, robotics and quantum computing. And, distinctly, cognitive warfare, strategic communication and counter-disinformation operations, with scenario-based exercises run on the first two.
That cluster deserves unpacking, because "cognitive warfare" is a term a candidate may well be asked about at the SSB and should be able to define without waffling.
Kinetic operations destroy things — a missile strike, an artillery barrage, a raid. Non-kinetic operations achieve effects without physical destruction: electronic warfare, cyber operations, information operations, economic pressure.
Cognitive warfare is the subset aimed at what an adversary population and leadership believe and decide. Its target is not a bridge or a radar. It is confidence — in the government, in the armed forces, in the reliability of information itself. A successful cognitive operation does not need a population to believe a specific falsehood. It only needs them to stop believing that anything can be verified. A society that cannot agree on what happened cannot agree on what to do about it.
This is why strategic communication and counter-disinformation were on the same agenda. The defensive response to cognitive attack is not censorship but credibility: an official information channel that is fast, accurate and trusted enough that people check it first. Building that is a peacetime task, and it fails if attempted only during a crisis.
Why the MEA and MHA were in the room follows directly. Cognitive warfare arrives through civilian networks. Border management involves central armed police forces under the Home Ministry. Sanctions, coalitions and the diplomatic framing of a conflict are External Affairs business. The programme's own conclusion was the need for coordination across diplomatic, informational, economic and military domains — the DIME framework — and a whole-of-nation approach.
That phrase is the point of the entire exercise. A modern adversary does not confine itself to the military domain, so a response confined to the military domain will be a response to only part of the attack. Our NDA study material on general knowledge develops the higher defence organisation and the current structure in full.
The candidate's angle
For anyone heading towards the NDA and eventually the SSB, there is a specific lesson in this programme beyond its examinable content.
The officers in that room were senior — and they were being placed in a setting where their perspective would be contradicted by a naval officer, a diplomat, a police officer and an academic. That is uncomfortable by design. An officer who has spent a career inside one service acquires a way of seeing problems that is correct within that service and incomplete outside it. The only reliable corrective is structured exposure to people who see the same problem differently.
The SSB assesses something closely related. Group discussion, group planning and the command task are not tests of whether a candidate can dominate a group. They test whether a candidate can hold a position, listen to a contrary one, and revise without either collapsing or digging in. That is the junior version of what the CORE Programme asks of general officers. A candidate who understands why the Ministry of External Affairs belongs at a military seminar has understood something real about how modern conflict works — and will say something worth hearing when the interviewing officer asks about jointness.
🔑 Revision block
The event. Combined Operational Review and Evaluation (CORE) Programme 2026, 14–18 September 2026, Manekshaw Centre, New Delhi. Organised by HQ IDS, conducted by CENJOWS. Participants from the three Services, MoD, MEA and MHA, plus experts, academia and think tanks. CDS, Chief of the Naval Staff and CISC interacted with participants, as did the Vice Chief of the Air Staff and Vice Chief of the Army Staff.
HQ IDS. Raised 23 November 2001; apex tri-service organisation for higher defence management. Followed the Kargil Review Committee and the Group of Ministers report.
CISC. Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee — a three-star officer from any service; executive head of IDS; oversight of inter-service intelligence, doctrine, joint planning, budgetary allocation and training; subordinate only to the CDS on jointness.
CDS. Four-star; created 2019; also Secretary, Department of Military Affairs; principal military adviser on tri-service matters; permanent Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee. Service chiefs advise on their own service.
The eighteen-year gap. HQ IDS 2001 but CDS 2019 — an integrated staff without a single-point military head for eighteen years.
CENJOWS. Centre for Joint Warfare Studies, raised 2007 under HQ IDS, registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860.
Three terms. Jointness — services plan and operate together, structures stay separate. Integration — shared logistics, procurement, communications, intelligence; service HQ integrated with the MoD via the Department of Military Affairs. Theaterisation — theatre commands under a single commander for all assets in an area. Progression: cooperate → share → unify.
Existing joint commands. Andaman and Nicobar Command — the only geographical tri-service command. Strategic Forces Command — functional, nuclear delivery.
Kinetic vs non-kinetic. Kinetic destroys physically. Non-kinetic achieves effect without destruction — electronic warfare, cyber, information operations, economic pressure.
Cognitive warfare. Targets what an adversary population and leadership believe and decide. Success does not require belief in a falsehood — only the collapse of belief that anything can be verified. Countered by strategic communication and counter-disinformation, whose real currency is credibility built in peacetime.
DIME. Diplomatic, Informational, Economic, Military — the domains the programme concluded must be coordinated, under a whole-of-nation approach.
Technology on the agenda. Artificial intelligence, robotics, quantum computing, with scenario-based exercises on cognitive warfare and strategic communication.
🎯 Practice MCQs
Q1. Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff was raised in: (a) 1999 (b) 2001 (c) 2012 (d) 2019
→ (b) — 2019 is when the CDS post was created.
Q2. The Chief of Defence Staff also holds the office of: (a) Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee only (b) Secretary, Department of Military Affairs (c) National Security Adviser (d) Defence Secretary
→ (b) — and is permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.
Q3. The only geographical tri-service command in India is the: (a) Strategic Forces Command (b) Andaman and Nicobar Command (c) Western Command (d) Southern Naval Command
→ (b) — the Strategic Forces Command is functional, not geographical.
Q4. CENJOWS functions under: (a) The Ministry of External Affairs (b) Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (c) The National Security Council Secretariat (d) DRDO
→ (b)
Q5. The creation of a Chief of Defence Staff was recommended in the aftermath of: (a) The 1962 conflict (b) The 1971 war (c) The Kargil conflict of 1999 (d) Operation Parakram
→ (c) — through the Kargil Review Committee and the Group of Ministers report.
Q6. "Cognitive warfare" is best described as operations aimed at: (a) Destroying enemy command posts (b) Jamming enemy radars (c) Shaping what an adversary's population and leadership believe and decide (d) Disrupting enemy supply chains through blockade
→ (c)
Q7. Theaterisation refers to: (a) Joint exercises between two services (b) Placing all assets in a geographic area under a single commander (c) Integration of defence public sector undertakings (d) Relocating service headquarters
→ (b)
Q8. The Chief of Integrated Defence Staff is an officer of which rank? (a) Two-star (b) Three-star (c) Four-star (d) Five-star
→ (b)
Q9. In the DIME framework, the letters stand for: (a) Defence, Intelligence, Manpower, Equipment (b) Diplomatic, Informational, Economic, Military (c) Doctrine, Integration, Modernisation, Employment (d) Deterrence, Interdiction, Manoeuvre, Engagement
→ (b)
Q10. Consider the following statements: 1. Jointness and integration describe the same stage of tri-service reform. 2. The Strategic Forces Command is a functional, not a geographical, command. Which is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2
→ (b) — jointness is operating together with separate structures; integration means shared underlying systems.
📋 How this gets asked (PYQ pattern)
The higher defence organisation is one of the densest scoring areas in the NDA General Knowledge paper, and its questions are unusually stable year to year.
The office question asks who holds what — the rank of the CDS and the CISC, the dual role of the CDS as Secretary DMA, which body the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee heads. These are pure recall and they repeat.
The year question asks when a body was created, and the three dates that matter are 2001 for HQ IDS, 2019 for both the CDS and the Department of Military Affairs, and 2007 for CENJOWS. The 2001-versus-2019 pairing is asked often precisely because it catches candidates who assume the two arrived together.
The command question asks about the Andaman and Nicobar Command and the Strategic Forces Command, and almost always turns on the geographical versus functional distinction. Learn that one adjective and this question is free.
The concept question is where current affairs enters. Terms such as cognitive warfare, non-kinetic operations, whole-of-nation approach, grey zone and hybrid warfare now appear in defence writing constantly, and a candidate who can define them crisply has an advantage that extends well past the written paper into the interview. Definitions here should be one sentence each — a long, hedged answer on cognitive warfare is worse than a short exact one.
Preparing for the NDA? The higher defence organisation repays being learnt as a chart — body, year, rank, function — because the paper asks about the chart rather than the narrative. Build the base with our NDA study material, follow the daily NDA current affairs, and prepare with our faculty in the upcoming Cavalier courses in Delhi.
✍️ Written by Maj Sunil Chopra — Co-founder and defence studies faculty at The Cavalier. Reviewed by the Cavalier Faculty Desk.